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Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Proceduret 
Court costs in American civil procedure are allocated to the loser 
("loser pays") as elsewhere in the civilized world. As Theodor 
Sedgwick, America's first expert on damages opined, it is matter of 
inherent justice that the party found in the wrong should indemnify 
the party in the right for the expenses of litigation. Yet attorneys' fees 
are not allocated this way in the United States: they are allowed to fall 
on the party that incurs them (the ''American rule," better, the Ameri-
can practice). According to Albert Ehrenzweig, Austrian judge, emigre 
and then prominent American law professor, the American practice is 
"a festering cancer in the body of our law." This Article surveys Ameri-
can cost and fee allocation practices. The author hopes that the Article 
will serve as a prolegomenon from an American perspective for more-
encompassing comparative studies, including eventually of empirical 
studies. Preparing this Article has led the author to believe that the 
impact of fee allocation systems has been underappreciated in evalua-
tion of how well nations in fact deliver civil justice. 
There seem to be strong a priori reasons for believing that a 
rule which made the loser bear a greater part of his adver-
sary's expenses of suit would encourage compromises and 
diminish litigation, but confident conclusions about the mat-
ter must await further research. A preliminary survey and 
comparison of the practices which obtain in all the principal 
foreign countries in this respect might shed some light upon 
the question. 
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PROLOGUE AND INTRODUCTION 
In 1931 Professor Charles T. McCormick, a leading expert of the 
day on damages in U.S.-American law, wished for the study that the 
International Academy of Comparative Law is now conducting for the 
18th World Congress in 2010 in Washington DC. Had only the Acad-
emy fulfilled that wish and addressed this topic at its 1st World 
Congress in 1937, just possibly the United States might have a sys-
tem of civil procedure quite different from what it does have today. 
Had there been better knowledge in the United States of the 
rules applied elsewhere, just possibly the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure of 1938 might have rejected the American practice that each 
party bears its own attorneys' fees and might have substituted in its 
stead what we discuss here as the "loser pays" rule. The World Con-
gress did not, however, address this theme and December twentieth 
of that very year the U.S. Supreme Court reported the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to the U.S. Congress, which permitted them to be-
come law in 1938. 
Within the Federal Rules lay an innovation called discovery, the 
full effect of which in 1938 was not dreamt of, but which later, when 
combined with the practice of no-indemnity for attorneys' fees and 
with a change in lawyers' billing, seriously compromised the Ameri-
can system of civil procedure as a practical means for justly deciding 
fixed claims of ordinary size. Most states imitated the federal rules in 
most respects including discovery. Today discovery accounts for the 
lion's share of litigation expenses. Lawyers for the parties control the 
amount of discovery. That means that they determine total attorneys' 
fees. The practice of no-indemnity allows them to render the victories 
of their adversaries pyrrhic and the claims of their adversaries' cli-
ents worthless.1 
This report describes cost and fee allocation under the civil proce-
dure ofthe federal courts of the United States and ofthe State of New 
York. It does not address the cost and fee allocation systems of the 
other forty-nine states of the United States other than in occasional 
generalities. Each state has its own unique rules. While these rules 
vary in detail, most parallel the federal or New York systems. The 
principal exception is that of Alaska, which is a variation of loser 
pays.2 
1. For a look at how this works in real life, see JONATHAN B. WILSON, OUT OF 
BALANCE: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE AMERICAN LITIGATION SYSTEM 41-59 
(2005). For a look at similar issues in England with reference to German and Ameri-
can practices, see Adrian Zuckerman, Lord Justice Jackson's Review of Civil 
Litigation Costs-Preliminary Report (2009), 28 CIV. JUST.Q. 435 (2009). 
2. See Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser Pays: Where Next?, 42 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1571, 1180-1186 (1996). 
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I. THE BASIC RULES: WHO PAYS? 
The basic rules of allocation are different for court costs and for 
attorneys' fees. For court costs, the losing party pays all of the pre-
vailing party's costs; only exceptionally is there a reduction. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 54(d)(1). The rules on appeal are the same as in the first in-
stance. FED. R. APP. P. 39. 
Costs include modest witness fees, but ordinarily do not include 
compensation of expert witness, since most experts are presented by 
parties. Ordinarily, only when experts are appointed by the court do 
allowed costs include expert compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (3) & 
(6). Costs are regulated by statute. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54; N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 8101-8110, 8201-8204, 8301-8303a. 
Attorneys' fees, on the other hand, are subject to a different prac-
tice. Only exceptionally must losing parties pay attorneys' fees of 
prevailing parties. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2). By tradition and, 
above all, in absence of statutes directing awards, with only a few 
minor judge-made exceptions, the practice is that there is no reim-
bursement for attorneys' fees. 3 
Since the vast majority of all cases end without judgment, most 
with settlements, court decisions on fees in ordinary cases are uncom-
mon. While costs and attorneys' fees are included within these 
settlements, settlements are usually private arrangements among 
parties with no required formalities. Court decisions on fees under 
certain special statutory regimens are, however, common. We discuss 
those regimens in Sections II (Exceptions) and Section V.C. (Class 
Actions). 
A. Terminology 
The practice of not indemnifying prevailing parties for their at-
torneys' fees is known in the United States as the "American rule." It 
is not a true rule, since rarely is the practice compelled by statute or 
by court decision; it is a practice that continues to exist because no 
general law compels the contrary. In order to avoid suggesting that it 
is a rule, I use different terminology to identify what others call the 
American rule. I call it the "no-indemnity practice." I thereby avoid 
implications that the practice is uniform, or that it exists without ex-
ception or that it extends beyond attorneys' fees to encompass costs 
as well. 
A rule that permits indemnity to prevailing parties is commonly 
called in the United States the "English rule." Likewise to avoid con-
fusion, I do not use that term. Instead I speak of indemnity rules or of 
3. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975) ("[W]e are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, without 
legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation .... "). 
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loser-pays rules, using both interchangeably. Indemnity rules are 
common and few, if any, are identical to the rules in England, which 
themselves are in transition. The mistaken impression that all loser-
pays rules are like English rules has led American critics to assume 
deficiencies of the English rule are characteristic of indemnity rules 
generally.4 
B. Rationale for the No-Indemnity Practice 
The rationale most often given for the no-indemnity practice is to 
provide access to courts for poor and other risk-averse persons.5 We 
are indebted to Professor Leubsdorf for the observation that the ratio-
nale post-dates the practice. (He calls it a "pure anachronism."6) 
Perhaps that is not surprising. While rules are adopted as delibera-
tive acts, practices grow organically. 
The U.S. Supreme Court endorses the view that the no-indem-
nity practice promotes access to courts. It explained: "[s]ince 
litigation is at best uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely 
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit ... [Tlhe poor might be unjustly 
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the 
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel."7 In-
demnifying prevailing parties would discourage plaintiffs with 
plausible, but not clearly winning lawsuits, from suing.8 Worse, they 
might bring a lawsuit, be heavily outspent by the better off adver-
sary, and find themselves compelled upon defeat to indemnify their 
adversaries for attorneys' fees. 
Here we must step back a moment for a word of explanation for 
readers not familiar with American litigation. In the United States 
there are no general laws that keep attorneys' fees in proportion to 
amounts in dispute. In the United States, attorneys' fees are largely 
4. See George B. Shepherd, The Impacts of the Fee-Shifting on Litigation Behav-
ior, BALANCING INTERESTS, LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAy FESTSCHRIFT PETER HAy 381 
(2005). 
5. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule of Attorney Fee Allocation: The Un-
jured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1567, 1594 (1993). 
6. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Fee Recovery, 47 
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9, 10 (1984). He also suggests that its original adoption 
resulted from inability of the American bar at the time to get statutory fees increased. 
7. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
Some judges indentify the rule with democracy and the right to be heard. See, e.g., 
Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc. 851 F. 2d 790 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[tjhe American Rule has been 
perpetuated because it represents a democratic ideal. Unfettered access to the courts 
for all citizens with genuine legal disputes has become a cornerstone of the American 
concept of justice. All persons are entitled to their day in court, however poor they 
may be and however rich their opponents."). 
8. Cr., Matthew J. Wilson, Failed Attempt to Undermine the Third Wave: Attor-
ney Fee Shifting Movement in Japan, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1457, 1462 (2005) 
("Because Japan and the United States are virtually alone ... this rule might be 
referred to as the 'American-Japanese" Rule.") See also, id. at 58 (referring to parties 
with ''viable'' claims not suing.). 
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uncontrolled. Lawyers-and not judges-largely shape the course of 
litigation. Lawyers-and not judges-largely determine how much 
time goes into anyone lawsuit. Since time literally is money-today 
most American lawyers bill based on time9-lawyers in effect set at-
torneys' fees for both sides. No fee tables limit lawyers' fees. As a 
result, it is not uncommon for parties' combined legal bills to equal or 
exceed amounts in controversy.lO 
It is this world of unbounded attorneys' fees that American law-
yers inhabit when they contemplate a loser-pays alternative. Not 
without justification they fear that impecunious plaintiffs who have 
temerity to sue wealthy defendants, particularly corporate defend-
ants, will be over-spent and overwhelmed by their adversaries' 
superior arms;l1 when vanquished they will be compelled to pay for 
their folly by reimbursing their adversaries for the attorneys' fees 
that they themselves could not afford. 12 
American lawyers' fears of an indemnity world may be height-
ened by their experiences with the limited indemnity rules that they 
do have. Litigation over attorneys' fee indemnity can cost more than 
the original fees. The U.S. Supreme Court in denigrating a general 
loser-pays rule observed: "the time, expense, and difficulties of proof 
inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable at-
torney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial 
administration.13 The Court was not contemplating foreign alterna-
tives, such as the German fixed recoverable costs system, where 
recoverable costs are easily predicted beforehand. 
American reluctance to embrace a loser-pays rule, such as 
prevails in much of the world, is also in part attributable to a ten-
9. The principal exception is the contingent fee system discussed below. 
10. This phenomenon is well-known to practitioners-I experienced it myself in 
more than one case-and to the public at least since 1853 when Charles Dickens told 
of the infamous fictitious case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in BLEAK HOUSE: 
"[Oln the numerous difficulties, contingencies, masterly fictions, and 
forms of procedure in this great Cause, there has been expended study, abil-
ity, eloquence, knowledge, intellect .... [Ilt must be paid for in money .... " 
"Do I understand that the whole estate is found to have been absorbed in 
costs?" 
"Hem! I believe so." .... 
"And that thus the suit lapses and melts away." 
Chap. LXV. A recent announcement for a bar program puts it succinctly: "At times, 
attorneys' fees exceed the amount in dispute and become the litigation 'tail that wags 
the dog.'" Santa Clara County Bar Association, Program on Costs, Fees and Statutory 
Offers, April 23, 2008, available at http://www.calegaladvocates.org/calendar/event. 
188433-Costs_Fees_and_Statutory _Offers. 
11. See Vargo, supra note 5, at 1595-1596. 
12. Of course, one way to avoid this problem would be to limit the reimbursable 
amount. See the discussions in Section VII. 
13. See, e.g, Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. at 718. 
See also Marshall J. Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney 
Fees, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 249 (1984). 
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dency among American lawyers to see lawsuits as events divorced 
from the rights and duties that lawsuits determine.14 Instead of see-
ing indemnity as a natural consequence of a judicial determination 
that one party is in the right and the other is not, they see indemnity 
as a penalty imposed for choosing to obtain a judicial determination 
of that right. Indemnity, they believe, imposes "strict liability without 
fault for unsuccessfully suing or defending a claim."15 Of course, that 
tendency is strengthened if the indemnity is at a ruinous rather than 
at a modest level. 
II. EXCEPTIONS AND MODIFICATIONS 
A. Exceptions 
Although no-indemnity is a matter of practice and not of rule, 
most exceptions to it are not judge-made, but are products of legisla-
tion or of private agreement. When it comes to issues of attorneys' 
fees, American courts defer to statutory enactment and to party 
choice. The few judge-made exceptions to the no-indemnity practice 
address particular factual situations that are unlikely to be of suffi-
cient interest to find mention in the general report. 16 Below, in a 
later section, we discuss when parties choose in their contracts to 
adopt an indemnity rule in dispute resolution; in this section we dis-
cuss exceptions created by statute. 
One-way fee shifting statutes 
There are said to be over two thousand statutes that impose stat-
utory exceptions to no-indemnity practice.17 While a few such 
statutes impose a general loser-pays rule,18 most provide only for so-
called "one-way fee shifting." In one-way fee shifting one side is enti-
tled to attorneys' fees if that side wins (most typically the plaintiffs' 
14. See Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Shifting Fairer than Two-Way Shifting?, 414 
F.R.D. 351 (1992) (an exception that makes the point about conflicting claims of 
right). See also Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: 
Allocating Attorney's Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. 
REV. 65, 72-75 (1996) (suggesting three characterizations of trial and settlement, all 
of which are divorced from the claim of right). 
15. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity of Compensation? The Contract with 
America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN 
L.J. 317, 321 (1998). 
16. See, e.g., Vargo, supra note 5, at 1578-1587 (discussing, inter alia, "common 
fund," "substantial benefit doctrine," "contempt" and "bad faith"); Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, supra, 421 U.S. at 257-259 (stating "These 
exceptions are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow at-
torneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress."); Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.s. 32 (1991) (holding court has inherent authority to impose at-
torneys' fees as sanction for bad faith in litigation). 
17. Id. at 1629. 
18. See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 
2051 n.48 (1993) (citing examples). 
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side), but if that party loses, ordinarily that party is not subject to a 
claim from the other side for attorneys' fees. These statutory excep-
tions to the no-indemnity practice are designed to, and usually do, 
encourage lawsuits.19 
The great majority of one-way fee shifting statutes implement 
public policy by encouraging non-governmental actors to act as "pri-
vate attorneys general" in the enforcement of public law norms. 
These statutes are found throughout public law in areas as disparate 
as racial discrimination, crime control, taxation, and market regula-
tion. Of course, the statutes need not have used the vehicle of one-
way fee shifting to encourage private attorneys general bringing suit. 
The incentive they did use, as we shall shortly see, is directed princi-
pally to plaintiffs' attorneys. Older and more well-known incentives 
that they might have used would have been directed to plaintiffs 
themselves, e.g., a share in the government's recovery (so-called qui 
tam actions), enhanced private damages (treble damages) or punitive 
damages. 
One-way fee shifting statutes encourage litigation in cases that 
are not likely candidates to produce high-dollar judgments, either be-
cause relief sought is non-monetary or because only modest amounts 
of money are at stake.20 Such cases would not normally be candidates 
for contingent fee representation (see section below), because there is 
not enough money at the end of the line to pay plaintiffs' attorneys 
their fees. Introduce one-way shifting, and now there is money for 
attorneys' fees. These cases become comparable to contingent fee 
cases, that is, clients have no downside risks and, therefore, no rea-
son not to sue.21 There is no downside risk for clients and the only 
risk for lawyers is their own time and money. Change those same 
cases further into two-way fee shifting case, and you strip them of 
contingent-fee comparability. Now clients with modest claims or 
seeking non-monetary relief will care; they will avoid litigation if 
they possibly can.22 
There is no single law that governs one-way fee shifting statutes. 
The Supreme Court has observed that they "differ considerably 
among themselves." One practitioner's treatise divides them into 
nineteen different classes spread over three thick loose-leaf 
volumes.23 Most are rudimentary in the instructions they give to fa-
cilitate their application. For example, one of the more important, the 
19. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.s. at 261-263. 
Breger, supra note 13, at 251. 
20. Krent, supra note 18, at 2048-2054. 
21. See Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: [Smell the Efficiency of the 
English Rule: Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGISL. J. 
1, 7 n. 26 (2006). 
22. [d. at 2050 n. 48. 
23. ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS (3rd ed., 4 loose-leaf volumes, last up-
dated 2009). 
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Voting Rights Act of 1965, provides only: "the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee .... " 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 l(e). Their very variety suggests that not plan but 
particularist interests are behind each one individually. 
B. Mandatory Pre-Litigation Procedures (e.g., Arbitration) 
In different statutes the U.S. Congress has given local federal 
courts authority to adopt mandatory arbitration or mediation proce-
dures. E.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1998. I have not reviewed these local rules, but I do 
not believe that many, if any, introduce new rules regarding costs or 
attorneys' fees. 
C. Agreements Allocating Costs and Fees 
Agreements allocating costs and fees are permissible24 and have 
been accepted for a long time.25 Sometimes they have been controlled 
by statute. Other times, when sought enforced, they have been sub-
ject to case-by-case control as unconscionable contract terms where 
deemed one-sided.26 The generally weak level of American control of 
unconscionable contract terms (not, as in Europe, unfair terms), 
means control of such terms is exceptional. 27 
D. Self-Representation (pro se) 
Federal law, first adopted in 1789,28 permits parties in federal 
court to "plead and conduct [their] own cases personally." 28 U.S.C. 
§1654.29 That right is recognized throughout the United States and is 
known as a right to pro se representation. While the right to proceed 
pro se is seen as "a basic right of a free people,"30 its rationale today is 
more pragmatic: to provide access to justice. 
24. See, e.g., Zuver v, Airtouch Communications, Inc., 153 Wash. 2d. 293,103 P. 
3d 753 (2004). 
25. See Annotation, Validity of provision in promissory note or other evidence of 
indebtedness for payment, as attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs of collection, of speci-
fied percentage of note, 17 AL.R.2d 288 (1951). 
26. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulo, 924 P. 2d 357 (Utah 1996) (patient against physician, 
substantively unconscionable because required plaintiff to pay if awarded less than 
half claim). 
27. See James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic 
Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L .L. 109 (2003). 
28. § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
29. See Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 103 (2002); Drew Swank, Note and Comment: The Pro Se 
Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373 (2005); Nina Ingwer Van Wormer, Note: Help at 
Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 
V AND. L. REV. 983 (2007). 
30. O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (Friendly, C.J.) ("The 
Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of a free people."). 
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In the United States there is no general right to a lawyer in civil 
cases. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The 
right to proceed alone, without a lawyer, i.e. pro se, thus is essential 
to participation in legal proceedings. Were there no right to pro se 
representation, the United States would either have to provide the 
indigent with legal representation (civil legal aid), or it would deny 
people the right to be heard. 
Except in small claims courts, self-representation is not common 
in civil cases. Existing procedures are not set up to facilitate pro se 
representation. On practical grounds most parties obtain legal coun-
sel. The active role of attorneys and the passive role of judges 
practically preclude pervasive employment of pro se representation. 
Greater use of self-representation would require that courts provide 
new services and assist pro se litigants in ways that they have not 
previously assisted parties.31 
III. ENCOURAGEMENT OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF LITIGATION 
Whether American cost and fee allocation rules encourage or dis-
courage a particular lawsuit depends upon the type of case and upon 
the concerns of the potential plaintiff. Is the potential plaintiff more 
concerned about the cost to get in, the cost to stay in, or the value to 
be gotten out of the lawsuit?32 American lawsuits are often compared 
to lotteries33 and, in this respect, they do look like lotteries. Like 
most lotteries, the price of admission is low. Like players in most lot-
teries, many plaintiffs hope for big wins. Like players in most 
lotteries, most plaintiffs are disappointed: they walk away with little 
or nothing other than the pleasure (?) in playing the game. 
Most studies of American cost and fee allocation conclude that 
low costs and no-indemnity practice compared to loser pays en-
courage lawsuits of low merit and discourage lawsuits of substantial 
merit.34 
31. See generally THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION: REPORT FROM 
THE MARCH 2005 SUMMIT (National Center for State Courts, 2005), available at www. 
ncsc.org. 
32. See, e.g., ROBERT G. STEINER, GETTING IN, GETTING OUT, GETTING PAID (1981). 
33. See, e.g., AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM: HOW THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY IS DISTORTING 
JUSTICE AND COSTING NEW YORKERS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EVERY YEAR (Public Policy 
Institute, 1998); DOUGLASS S. LoDMELL & BENJAMIN R. LODMELL, THE LAWSUIT LOT-
TERY: THE HIJACKING OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2004); JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE 
LAWSUIT LOTTERY (1979). 
34. See MARIE GRYPHON, GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COST: How A "LOSER PAYS" 
RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT, No. 11 
(Manhattan Institute, December 2008) [Emphasis in original]. With respect to contin-
gent fee lawsuits, Herbert Kritzer speaks of "a cross-subsidy among clients. The client 
who turns out to have a very good case subsidizes the client whose case turns out to be 
a dog." KRITZER, RISKS, infra note 45, at 260. 
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Court costs, including filing fees, are low. Even the federal case, 
the luxury model lawsuit, costs only $350 to enter, no matter how low 
or high the claim is. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. That is surely by design. 
Attorneys' fees, on the other hand, are more complicated. How 
much parties have to pay up front to their lawyers in the form of 
retainer fees is entirely a matter of practice. It varies from lawyer-to-
lawyer and case-to-case. Above all, it depends upon whether the law-
yer works on a contingent fee, no fee or non-contingent fee basis (i.e., 
flat rate or hourly rate) or some combination of non-contingent and 
contingent fees. In the following section we discuss these different 
types of fees. When attorneys' fees are not contingent and plaintiffs 
must advance them upfront, those fees must discourage lawsuits. 
How much is an individual matter. Individual lawyers are free to re-
quire as high or low retainers as they see fit. We discuss contingent 
fees below. 
The no-indemnity practice permits, and by permitting encour-
ages, inflating claims, since there is no sanction for parties who claim 
a lot and win little or nothing. Wildly inflated claims are common. I 
personally was sued for more than $300,000 for a slip-and-fall acci-
dent that occurred in my house and resulted in medical bills below 
$20,000; after three depositions the insurance company settled for 
nuisance value of around $7000. In the most notorious recent case 
the plaintiff, who happened to be a judge, sued for $54 million from a 
drycleaner who lost a pair of pants. The drycleaner "won", but only 
after paying nearly $100,000 in non-recoverable legal fees. 35 
IV. THE DETERMINATION OF COSTS AND FEES 
A. Determination of Court Costs 
Court costs are determined by statutory lists of charges imposed 
for a handful of matters. Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, limits these 
charges to six specific types of expenses listed in the margin.36 These 
charges are independent of the amount in controversy and, except in 
unusual cases where court-appointed experts or interpreters are used 
heavily, are trivial compared to attorneys' fees. The statutory list is 
exclusive and has not permitted inclusion of other expenses, such as 
35. Id. at 2. 
36. "(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically re-
corded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and 
disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of 
making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in 
the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court 
appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and 
costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1820. 
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costs of electronic legal research charges.37 New York State practice 
is similar. 
Typically, the winning party prepares a bill of costs and submits 
the bill to the clerk of the court, who then reviews and approves it. 
Judicial involvement is exceptional. 
B. Determination of Attorneys' Fees: The Role of "Pretrial" 
Attorneys' fees are determined by agreements between lawyers 
and their clients. They are not mandated and are only exceptionally 
controlled by law. The principal control is that in some jurisdictions 
the percentage of a recovery subject to a contingent fee is limited. 
1. Fee Calculation Methods: Flat Rate, Contingent, and 
Hourly Billing 
Historically, American lawyers have charged fees in variations of 
three principal approaches: (1) task-based flat fees; (2) success-based 
contingent fees; and (3) time-based hourly fees. When cost shifting 
was more common in the early part of the nineteenth century, fees 
were principally task-based. The success-based contingent fees be-
came popular only in the latter part of the nineteenth century.38 
Time-based hourly fees became common only in the 1950s and 1960s 
when pre-trial discovery began to be widely used.39 
2. Generating Fees: Discovery 
The introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 
proved enormously important for American civil procedure in general 
and for generation of attorneys' fees in particular. Since adoption of 
the federal rules in 1938, the focus of American litigation has moved 
from trial practice to pre-trial discovery. Trial has vanished and pre-
trial procedures have replaced it.40 Although many cases are settled 
without substantial pretrial discovery, most settle in its shadow. 
Pretrial discovery knows few bounds.41 It leaves the lawyers to 
be the judges of what they shall do. But worse than that, it leaves to 
37. Sarah Wise, Comment: Show Me the Money! The Recoverability of Computer-
ized Legal Research Expenses by the Prevailing Party in the Federal Circuits. 36 CAP. 
V.L. REV. 455, 480 (2007). 
38. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanc-
tioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 
(1998). 
39. See WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING 
By ATTORNEYS 9 et seq (1996) (2nd ed. forthcoming). 
40. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009). 
41. The permissible scope of discovery extends to any matter "that is relevant to 
any party's claim or defense," is not limited to information admissible at trial, and can 
extend to "any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 26(b)(I). Recently imposed limitations on quantity of discovery are meaning-
ful only in larger cases. Without leave of the court, each side may order up to ten 
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them to be judges of what their adversaries shall do. Under federal 
discovery rules and their counterparts in the states, lawyers, often at 
little cost to themselves or their clients, can compel their adversaries 
and their clients to make burdensome discovery of documents and 
participate in pointless depositions. It takes little imagination for a 
lawyer determined to do so, to render a plaintiffs modest- to even 
large-sized claim for compensation of little value.42 
C. Judicial Determination of Attorneys' Fees 
As we have seen, in most American cases there is no fee-shifting 
and no occasion for courts to determine fees. Cases where courts are 
involved in determining attorneys' fees are statutes permitting "one-
way" fee shifting, i.e., losing defendants pay, but losing plaintiffs do 
not. We saw that there is a plethora of one-way fee shifting statutes. 
Most provide little direction to courts for determination of fees. 
It is not surprising that given such little statutory direction, 
there is what one appellate panel including former Supreme Court 
Justice O'Connor characterized as "confusion" in fee-setting jurispru-
dence. While American courts have not all coalesced behind the 
details of how to determine a reasonable fee, they start from the same 
assumption; the initial measure should be the billing approach of 
American lawyers generally:43 number of lawyers' hours spent multi-
plied by a reasonable hourly rate (the "lodestar" approach). Where 
they diverge is how they apply that calculation. Some say a reasona-
bly hourly rate is that of lawyers in the vicinity of the court ("forum 
rule"); others say it should be the rate of lawyers brought in from 
more expensive areas. Some say the lodestar amount should be the 
measure; others say that the lodestar amount should only be a "pre-
sumptively reasonable," to be adjusted by other factors, including by 
such a measure as what a "reasonable client would be willing to 
pay."44 Notwithstanding the latter check, all approaches start from 
the perspective of lawyers who invest time in bringing lawsuits, and 
not from the perspective of paying clients who calculate what they· 
have to gain-usually based on amounts in controversy. 
depositions of seven hours each. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(1). It is said that those 
limits are easily waived in larger cases. 
42. Before the Federal Rules lawyers had similar opportunities with pre-trial mo-
tions, but these were not as extensive as with discovery. Similar opportunities still 
exist. 
43. See generally supra note 39. 
44. See Arbor Hill Citizens Neighborhood Association v. County of Albany, 493 
F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
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v. SPECIAL ISSUES: SUCCESS-ORIENTED FEES, CLASS ACTIONS, SALE 
OF CLAIMS, AND LITIGATION INSURANCE 
A. Success-Oriented Fees 
The principal form of success-oriented fees in the United States 
is the pure contingent fee. In pure contingent fees lawyers receive 
fees if, and only if, they prevail for their clients.45 Then they receive 
their fees, not from plaintiffs, but from the money that they recover 
for their clients. Plaintiffs benefit because they have no downside risk 
from lawsuits: win or lose they need pay neither their attorneys' fees 
nor their adversaries' attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs' attorneys benefit be-
cause they have no difficulty collecting fees, even very large ones, so 
long as they are successful. Not every lawsuit permits contingent fee 
representation, but when lawsuits do so allow, individuals prefer con-
tingent fees. 46 
Contingent fee representation is available only in certain situa-
tions. In most lawsuits, it is not available to defendants to fund 
representation, since in most lawsuits defendants do not recover 
money judgments. Likewise, contingent fee representation is not 
available to plaintiffs who do not seek money damages, since pure 
declaratory relief does not produce money from which lawyers can be 
paid.47 Nor does it work well with those claims for small amounts 
which, unless aggregated ("class actions"), are too small to generate 
sufficient funds to cover litigation expenses. 
Because of the absence of downside risk, many, perhaps most in-
dividuals prefer contingent fee representation when they can get it.48 
We saw in Subsection II.A., above, that one-way fee shifting statutes 
approximate the effect of contingent fee representation for claims for 
non-monetary relief, for claims for small amounts, and for defend-
ants' claims, in those rare instances where the one-way is the 
defendant's way. Two-way fee shifting, i.e., loser-pays, of course does 
not approximate those effects. Indeed, loser-pays undercuts plaintiffs' 
principal reason for choosing contingent-fee representation: the ab-
sence of down-side risk. 
Contingent fees have long been controversial, but have been part 
of American civil litigation for well over a century. Scholars debate 
not the acceptance of contingent fees, but the timing of their wide-
spread adoption. They certainly found wide application-if not 
45. See generally, HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CON-
TINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (2004). 
46. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGA-
TION 58 (1990). 
47. The rule that prefers money damages over specific performance does mean 
that contingent fee recovery is available more often than it would be in systems that 
favor specific performance over damages. 
48. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 46. 
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always approval-by the turn of the twentieth century. Just when in 
the nineteenth century they became common and not exceptional is 
at issue.49 
Contingent fee representation is available only to those parties, 
almost always plaintiffs, who are able to persuade lawyers to "take 
their case." For most lawyers most of the time, taking a case is a risk 
decision. 50 Principal factors in taking or declining a case are three: 
proof of plaintiffs damages, proof of defendant's liability and the law-
yer's practice area. Herbert Kritzer calls these the "three 'R' factors: 
risks, rewards, and reputations." He reports that among those law-
yers he studied, of decisions to decline representation 47% were 
based on absence of defendants' liability alone, 19% on insufficient 
plaintiffs' damages alone, 13% on defendants' liability and plaintiffs 
damages both, 11% on being outside their practice area, and 11% on 
other grounds.51 From the lawyer's perspective, the ideal contingent 
fee case is in the lawyer's practice area, is easy to prove, and produces 
large damages. Conversely the baneful case is outside the lawyer's 
practice area, is difficult to prove, and produces modest or no 
damages. 
Assumed in discussions of contingent fee representation is the 
open-ended nature of American legal fees. When limitations on con-
tingent fees are discussed, usually they are couched in terms of the 
percentage of the eventual recovery that the contingent fee lawyer 
may take. Thirty-three percent is the usual benchmark, but percent-
ages may be higher or lower or variable.52 
Based on my practice experience and other observation, but on 
no studies that I can cite, I believe that contingent fee representation, 
when coupled with the open-ended nature of American legal fees, 
cause plaintiffs' lawyers working on contingency to prefer similarly 
open-ended claims (such as tort cases with huge damages, mental 
damages, pain-and-suffering and the like) over determinate claims 
(such as many contract claims). That is, if the amount of recovery is 
limited, for example, to the amount flowing from a breach of contract 
where there is no possibility of consequential or otherwise open-en-
ded damages, then a contingent fee is not attractive. The side 
opposing the claim can force the plaintiffs lawyer to spend it into 
oblivion. 
Not surprising, contingent fees are mostly a feature of tort claims 
on behalf of individual plaintiffs. According to one of Kritzer's stud-
49. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanc-
tioning of Contingent Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 232 (1998); 
Stephan Landsman, The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (1998)_ 
50. John A. Day, Should you risk taking the case?, TRlAL, January 2008, at 20. 
51. KRITZER, RISKS, supra note 45, at 84-89 (note Table 3-9). 
52. KRITZER, RISKS, supra note 45, at 37-44. 
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ies, most individual parties have contingent fee arrangements, while 
most organizational parties have hourly fee arrangements. 53 Their 
use in contracts claims is less common. If I am correct in my belief, a 
study might show that that contingent fees in contract cases are used 
principally in very simple cases where liability is practically conceded 
(e.g., collection cases for unpaid and undisputed invoices)54 and in 
those cases where open-ended damages are possible (e.g., consequent-
ial damages). This may be one reason why in contract litigation 
lawyers try to find a tort upon which to base an open-ended punitive 
damage claim. 
I am no psychologist, but I also believe that contingent fees ap-
plied to open-ended claims would be more socially acceptable than 
when applied to determinate claims. In the former case, if, as Profes-
sor Kritzer put it, "the case proves to be a 'real winner,' the lawyer 
will share in that good fortune;"55 in the latter case, the lawyer who 
takes thirty-three percent or more of plaintiffs' recovery appears to 
the public to be a blood-sucking leech. 
B. Financing Litigation through Sale of Claims 
In recent years a litigation financing industry has grown up in 
the United States. It does not, however, include selling claims for 
purposes of litigation. The prohibition on champerty, found in New 
York at section 489 of the Judiciary Law, prohibits selling of claims 
"with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceed-
ing thereon." Lawyers are under an obligation, found in Disciplinary 
Rule 5-103 of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (1983), not to acquire a "proprietary interest in 
the cause of action." (The rule explicitly exempts contingent fee repre-
sentation from this provision.) The code of best practices of the 
American Legal Finance Association, a trade association, explicitly 
provides that its members will not acquire ownership interests in 
consumers' litigation. 56 
The industry does not buy claims; it lends money at high rates in 
non-recourse loans with the expectation of recovering the loan plus 
interest from the eventual settlement of the lawsuits. Borrowers who 
recover nothing, are not obligated to repay. According to the trade 
association, most of its members do not extend loans for more than 
ten percent of the estimated values of cases. 57 The Attorney General 
53. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 46, at 58-59. 
54. The professional organization for lawyers doing collection work is the Com-
mercial Law League of America. See its website at http://www.clla.org!. 
55. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 46. 
56. "Industry Best Practices - ALF A's Code of Conduct, No.2," available at http:// 
www.americanlegalfin.comlIndustry BestPractices.asp. 
57. FAQ, "Is it harder to settle a case with a non-recourse advance in place?," 
available at http://www.americanlegalfin.comlfaq.asp. 
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of the State of New York has given state sanction to the practice, so 
long as the loans are accompanied by adequate disclosures. 58 Never-
theless, aNew York State Court of first instance found one such loan 
illegal. The court determined that the loan did not constitute cham-
perty, because it was made only after litigation was commenced. The 
court nevertheless set the loan aside on different ground: usury. The 
loan provided for interest of 3.85% per month compounding monthly. 
The court rejected the lender's argument that since the loan was non-
recourse, i.e., the borrower had no obligation if the claim failed, it 
could not constitute usury, since lender shared the risk. Here, the 
court found, there was no risk and that meant that the loan was sub-
ject to usual lending standards. 59 
C. Class Actions 
Class actions ("aggregate litigation") are presented as one way to 
facilitate contingent fee representation for small claims. Since 2003, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Rule 23(h) have required that 
courts, as part of their approval of class action settlements, decide on 
the "reasonable attorneys' fee" to be allowed.60 The method for deter-
mination of that amount follows the approach of determination under 
the one-way fee shifting statutes discussed above in Subsection II.A. 
The 2003 Advisory Committee notes that the new rule takes no posi-
tion on whether that fee should be determined by the "lodestar" 
hourly basis or on a percentage of recovery basis. 
D. Legal Insurance 
While there have been attempts to provide legal insurance in the 
United States, these have found little application in providing insur-
ance to plaintiffs. What may be the largest provider of legal 
insurance is ARAG Legal Solutions, a subsidiary of the German firm 
Allgemeine Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs Aktien Gesellschaft.61 
58. PRESS RELEASE, "PERSONAL INJURY CASH ADVANCE FIRMS AGREE TO REFORMS," 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2005/feb/feb28a_05.html. 
59. Echeverria v. Estate of Linde, NO. : 018666/2002 (N.Y. Supreme Court, Nas-
sau County, 2005). For discussions of this decision see Anthony J. Sebok, A New York 
Decision That May Imperil Plaintiffs' Ability to Finance Their Lawsuits: Why It 
Should Be Repudiated, Or Limited to Its Facts, FindLaw (2005) http:// 
writ.news.findlaw.com/sebokl20050418.html (with hyperlink to decision); Susan 
Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in 
the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 93-95 (2008). For further information 
on the practice, see Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild 
West of Finance Should be Tamed not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 
(2004); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical 
Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007). 
60. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Settlement of 
Class Actions, 1. J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167 (2009). 
61. See www.araggroup.com. 
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Liability insurance for defendants, on the other hand, is com-
mon. Medical doctors would not practice without malpractice 
insurance; automobile owners are not allowed to drive without liabil-
ity insurance; homeowners cannot get mortgages without 
homeowner's liability insurance. Liability insurance contracts typi-
cally provide a "duty to defend," and thus furnish defendants with de 
facto legal insurance for their lawsuit expenses, including attorneys' 
fees, in addition to indemnifying them against claims successfully 
made.62 
In December 2008, the Manhattan Institute proposed a loser-
pays system for the United States. That proposal considers creation 
of legal expense insurance key to success. The report acknowledges 
that any a loser-pays plan must assure access to justice for poor and 
middle-income plaintiffs. It envisions legal expense insurance as the 
most likely mechanism to achieve that goa1.63 
VI. LEGAL Am 
Civil Legal Aid 
As we saw above in Subsection II.D. on self-representation, there 
is no legal right to state-support for representation in civil litigation. 
Some Americans recognize that the United States is alone among 
modern nations in its near total failure to provide legal aid to indi-
gent litigants.64 Law reform groups have focused more on obtaining 
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in civil ac-
tions-possibly found in state constitutions-than they have on 
adopting legislation.65 The American Bar Association has called upon 
legislatures to adopt statutes mandating legal aid in a small class of 
cases ''where basic human needs are at stake, ... as determined by 
each jurisdiction."66 
Such legal aid as is available is provided mostly by private 
groups with a modest level of government funding through lawyers 
62. The Duty to Defend, in 1 THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.01 (Matthew 
Bender & Co., 2009). 
63. GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COSTS: How A "LOSER PAYS" RULE WOULD IMPROVE 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (Marie Gryphon, Civil Justice Report No. 11, Decem-
ber 2008, Manhattan Institute) available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdfl 
cjc11.pdf. 
64. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice for America's Poor in the Year 2020: Some Pos-
sibilities Based on Experiences Here and Abroad, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 393 (2009); 
Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with 
the Rest of the Developed World 2006 Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Civil Gideon: 
Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & Crv. 
RTS. L. REV. 769 (2006). 
65. See Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of Open Courts and the Civil Right to Counsel, 
Symposium Issue: A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Civil Gideon in Maryland & 
Beyond, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 21 (2007). 
66. Resolution 112A, Task Force for Access to Civil Justice adopted unanimously 
by voice vote, available at http://www.abanet.org/mediaidocsl112Arevised.pdf. 
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whose principal practice is as legal aid attorneys for organizations.67 
It is provided as charity and not as of right. The first and oldest such 
private association, New York City's Legal Aid Society, was founded 
by immigrants from Germany. All forms of civil legal aid taken to-
gether, however, support very few civil litigants in absolute numbers. 
Of the nation's more than one million lawyers, only 6500 are legal aid 
lawyers. Of the nation's more than three hundred million people, 
those lawyers are expected to provide legal services for fifty to ninety 
million people. All legal aid programs combined are funded with less 
than $1 billion; in 2007, two American law firms, each earned over $2 
billion. 68 
While most legal aid is provided through legal aid organizations 
other lawyers do provide assistance as appointed counsel for low fees 
(uncommon) or as volunteer counsel for no fees (pro bono). The Amer-
ican Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
recommend that lawyers devote at least an hour-a-week to all forms 
of pro bono activity. Many do none and the average is less than one-
half hour.69 That is roughly the equivalent of about 12,000 lawyers 
working full time. 
Access to justice is a major issue in the United States.70 Contin-
gent fees and legal expense insurance are identified as alternatives to 
legal aid that do not require government funding. 71 As we have seen, 
no-indemnity practice and class actions are also justified on access to 
justice grounds. 
VII. LITIGATION COSTS AS BARRIERS TO BRINGING CLAIMS 
Wise American lawyers advise against giving any prediction of 
what likely expenses will be on both sides. It is not rare for expenses 
to exceed the amount in controversy. One story from small claims 
court makes the point dramatically. In this case a credit card com-
pany sued a person not a party to a credit agreement for $1879.83. 
The putative agreement allowed the lender to recover attorneys' fees; 
a state statute provided that the borrower could get attorneys' fees 
based on the same agreement. After several appeals, the defendant's 
total legal fees were over $30,000. They were not recoverable because 
defendant's defense was that he was not a party to the contract!72 
67. See Johnson, supra note 64, at 394-398. 
68. Johnson supra note 64, at 396 (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP 
and Latham & Watkins LLP). 
69. Kathleen Flynn Peterson, President's Page: A call to our highest ideals, 11 
TRIAL [Journal of the American Association for Justice] No. 43 (Nov. 2007). 
70. See, e.g., Editorial, Fulfilling Gideon's promise; The Justice Department's push 
for better legal representation for poor defendants, WASH. POST, March 9, 2010, at A18. 
71. See, e.g., KRITZKER, RISK, supra note 45, at 266. 
72. Jennifer M. Smith, Credit Cards, Attorney's Fees, and the Putative Debtor: A 
Pyrrhic Victory? Putative Debtors May Win the Battle But Nevertheless Lose the War, 
61 ME. L. REV. 171, 176-181 (2009). 
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VIII. COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. "American Exceptionalism" and Attorneys' Fee Allocation 
Contemporary American proceduralists, such as Professor Oscar 
G. Chase, when they explain peculiarities in American procedures 
compared to those procedures pertaining in the rest of the modern 
world, point to what they call "American exceptionalism." Their idea 
is that the considerable differences in American court procedures in 
resolving disputes compared to those in other systems have cultural 
origins. According to this view, those differences stem not from differ-
ences in legal culture, but from differences in general culture, that is, 
from differences in "a set of values and understandings that generally 
shared by the populations that constitutes the nation."73 In other 
words, fundamental values are different. By implication, learning 
drawn from foreign legal institutions has little applicability in such 
instances. 
Professor Chase cheerfully acknowledges that his thesis is con-
troversial. Certainly it is not universally held among American 
proceduralists, although I suspect that some of those who deny it in 
principle, nevertheless adhere to it in practice. One noted procedural-
ist who explicitly rejected the idea, was Edson R. Sunderland. 
Sunderland was the principal drafter of the pretrial discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That is remarkable 
because Chase identifies pretrial discovery as one of four features of 
American procedural exceptionalism. (The other three are the civil 
jury, the role of the judge and the role of experts.) Sunderland 
thought that resistance to borrowing from foreign institutions had a 
certain justification in substantive law, but not in legal procedure: 
[In legal procedure] we have nothing to do with the princi-
ples which control social and economic relations. We are 
concerned solely with the methods of administration. Rules 
of legal procedure are no more fundamental in the law than 
rules for accounting in manufacture or trade. Litigation is 
merely a means to an end, like transportation, and the same 
tests should apply to both.74 
While some comparativists adopt Chase's view, I do not think 
that many do when engaged in comparison of modern systems. In 
particular, I do not think that those American comparativists who 
73. Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50 
AM. J. COMPo L. 277 (2002); OSCAR G. CHASE, LAw, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING 
SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005) (especially Chapter 4, "American 'Ex-
ceptionalism' in Civil Litigation."). 
74. Edson R. Sunderland, Current Legal Literature, 15 A.B.A. J. 35 (1929). For a 
discussion of contemporary American views on social and economic aspects of litiga-
tion, see FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY G. HAzARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE Chapter 6 (5th ed. 2001). 
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are immersed in more than one modern legal system do. While they 
are cognizant of differences in legal and national culture, they do not, 
so far as I am aware, point to differences in national culture to ex-
plain differences in procedure. They point instead to different ways 
that professionals approach legal problems and to the professionals 
themselves. Max Rheinstein, one of the most noted of the emigre emi-
gration, who was immersed in two systems, saw the underlying cause 
of essential differences between common law and civil law in "the di-
versity of the personnel by which the machinery of justice is handled 
and guided."75 
This is not the place to have a friendly debate with supporters of 
the American exceptionalism thesis. I raise the issue here only as it 
relates to costs and attorney fees allocation. Some contemporary 
proceduralists (although not Professor Chase to my knowledge), see 
the American no-indemnity practice as another manifestation of 
American exceptionalism.76 
While the no-indemnity practice is peculiar to America, I do not 
see it as a manifestation of any fundamental cultural differences be-
tween the United States and other nations. I agree with Albert 
Ehrenzweig, Rheinstein's fellow emigre, who rejected the idea that 
our no-indemnity practice is founded on "a peculiar psychology of the 
American people." Ehrenzweig considered the practice to be contrary 
to American concern for the "little man." He compared it unfavorably 
to rules prevailing in totalitarian lands. He saw it as "a festering can-
cer in the body of our law."77 
75. Max Rheinstein Comparative Law and Legal Systems, in 9 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 204, 208 (1968), reprinted in 1 MAX RHEIN-
STEIN-GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 239, 246-47 (1979). 
76. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Book Review: All the World His Stage Arthur 
Taylor von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Private Interna-
tional Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Common-
and Civil-Law Systems, 52 AM. J. COMPo L. 741, 759 (2004); Scott Dodson, Review 
Essay: The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 133, 141 (2008); 
Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a 
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMPo L. 709, 710 (2005); James E. Pfander, Book Re-
view: Global Issues in Civil Procedure, 56 AM. J. COMPo L. 506, 512 (2008) ("one can 
see the American rule and contingency fee as a mode of financing litigation through 
the private sector, a choice that seems perfectly consistent with the American prefer-
ence for non-state solutions to most problems"). 
77. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Attorneys' fees in the Great Society: 
In sorrow and in anger-and in hope, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 793, 798 (1966). 
Ehrenzweig did not attribute no-indemnity practice to the self-interest oflawyers and 
judges. The emigres rarely spoke so openly that they might be thought to be impolite 
to their American hosts-at least not in English and not in the United States. Back 
home and in their own languages, it may have been a different story. See, e.g., Karl 
Loewenstein, Ketzerische Betrachtungen ilber die amerikanischen Verfassung, in DER 
STAAT ALS AUFGABE, GEDENKSCHRIFT FOR MAX IMBODEN 233-54, at 250 (1972) ("The 
U.S. system suffers notorious deficiencies. It is an open secret that the administration 
of justice is one of the least exemplary aspects of American civilization, even if the 
understandable class-interest of established jurists-judges as well as lawyers-pre-
cludes admitting it." [Author's translation]). 
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I do see contemporary American no indemnity practice as a man-
ifestation of lawyer dominance of the American legal system. No self-
respecting Continental ministry of justice would permit its continua-
tion. If one escapes the insular world of American litigators and 
assumes a comparative perspective, or even just the perspective of a 
client, the Rheinstein thesis of centrality of personnel as applied to 
attorneys' fees allocation is convincing. 
• In the first place, a loser-pays principle is practically a 
corollary to the idea that civil procedure determines 
rights to resolve disputes according to law to make 
wronged parties whole; that indemnity is part of the 
claim of right is recognized in almost every modern legal 
system, including in the systems of the United States 
with respect to court costs. 
• In the second place, the American rationale that the no-
indemnity practice promotes access to courts is a trans-
parent, after-the-fact rationalization; access to justice is 
better assured in most other modern nations. 
• In the third place, the history of the no-indemnity prac-
tice in American suggests that attorney self-interest was 
at work and not concern for fundamental principles. 
We address each of these seriatim and then turn to prognostications 
for the future. 
B. The Rights Rationale of Attorneys' Fee Allocation 
The purpose of civil lawsuits is determination of rights and du-
ties among private parties according to law. Determining rights and 
duties of parties resolves their disputes. If there were no civil law-
suits, private parties might use self-help to realize rights and to 
resolve disputes. The stronger, rather than the righteous, would pre-
vail. To preserve peace and right, modern legal systems prohibit self-
help except in a few limited cases.78 
From this starting point it follows that parties found in civil law-
suits to be in the right should not bear the expenses of those 
determinations. They are right; their opponents are wrong. The oppo-
nents could have conceded the claims of right, but did not. They 
compelled the righteous to bring suit. Not to indemnify the righteous 
for those expenses concedes to defendant-opponents the power to di-
minish the value of those rights. A loser-pays principle should guide 
cost and attorneys' fee allocation, even if considerations of equity or of 
efficiency in some classes of cases call for departures from that guide. 
78. See THOMAS W. SHELTON, THE SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 17-18 (1918). 
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The loser-pays principle is recognized around the world as the 
principal guide to allocating costs and attorneys' fees. In the United 
States it is recognized as the rule in taxing costs. In some states it 
was (and in at least one state still is) recognized as the principle to 
apply to allocating attorneys' fees. In American history it was recog-
nized by those who gave form to our civil procedure (David Dudley 
Field), and by those who gave form to our rules of damages and of 
interpretation (Theodore Sedgwick). 
C. The Vacuity of the Access to Justice Rationalization 
Proponents of American no-indemnity practice assert that it 
helps poor people bring claims and protects their access to justice. 
Ehrenzweig pointed out the twisted logic of that claim from a system-
perspective. Unless the system decides cases incorrectly more often 
than it decides them correctly, for every person with a doubtful claim 
no-indemnity encourages to bring suits, more persons with righteous 
claims are denied the full measure of their rights. 
There are better ways to encourage access to justice, and some 
Americans recognize that. In the literature, most point to legal aid, 
legal event insurance and self-representation procedures. Were we 
serious about improving access to justice for the poor, we would work 
at improving all three. Now, all exist in the United States in only the 
most anemic of forms. Most countries that have loser-pays also put 
more resources into one or more of these approaches than does the 
United States. 
Were the United States seriously to work to improve any of these 
three approaches, we would discover, as England apparently did in 
seeking to improve legal aid, that the most important task in improv-
ing access to justice is to bring expenses down. If we want to improve 
the system, the most important thing we can do-even before chang-
ing allocation rules-is to keep attorneys' fees proportionate to the 
amount in dispute. Whether the rule is loser-pays or the practice is 
no indemnity, the issue of allocation is of far less consequence if the 
magnitude of total expenses for all parties is a modest fraction-say 
ten percent-of the amount in controversy. 
D. The No-Indemnity Practice and American "Culture" 
No-indemnity practice is not as deeply ingrained into American 
practice, let alone into common understanding, as is sometimes 
thought. Opposed to that idea are the rules governing costs, of which 
attorneys' fees once were a part. The rationalization that it promotes 
access to justice is seen to be "shaky at best."79 
79. Accord, 2 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 269-270 (1991) (also describing the rationales for the no-indem-
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The history of attorney fee allocation has yet to be written. 80 
Much of that history remains unclear. What seems clear, however, is 
that no-indemnity is a practice ofthe bar that worked for it and not a 
solution consciously chosen to meet ideals of access to justice. The 
latter, as we have noted, is an after the fact rationalization. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century and continuing 
through the end of the century, some states had loser-pays rules. 
When the jurists whom Roscoe Pound credited with shaping Ameri-
can law proposed shaping the American law of cost and fee allocation, 
they proposed loser-pays rules. Here we speak of Theodore Sedgwick 
in damages and David Dudley Field in procedure. We do not here 
write the missing history, but we point out at modest length their 
proposals to challenge the idea that American values support no-
indemnity. 
Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. is little remembered today, but he wrote 
the leading American treatise on damages in the nineteenth century. 
Its last edition appeared in 1920 and was brought up-to-date by Jo-
seph Beale. Roscoe Pound counted Sedgwick's treatise on damages, 
along with Sedgwick's treatise on statutory interpretation, among a 
small number of treatises-half by Justice Story-that shaped Amer-
ican law in the pre-Civil War era.81 It is ironic and perhaps 
significant that Sedgwick was Alexis de Toqueville's research assis-
tant, for Professor Chase points to de Toqueville as the first to 
remark upon American exceptionalism. One might well look to 
Sedgwick as exponent of the highest of American ideals, for he repre-
sented of the Mricans who escaped from the slave ship Amistad. 
In the year that the Supreme Court decided the Amistad case, 
Sedgwick published the first systematic American work on costs, 
How Shall the Lawyers Be Paid?82 Sedgwick addressed the key issues 
that we address today. He did not ask only, "How shall the lawyer be 
paid?"; he posed the "query of equal moment to the community at 
large, and that is, How shall the client be paid?" By that he meant, 
nity practice as "shaky at best," particularly in falling short in providing full 
compensation to plaintiffs). 
80. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Re-
covery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9 (1984). 
81. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR, AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION 
RECOVERED IN SUITS AT LAW (1847, 9th ed. by Joseph Henry Beale, 1920). Roscoe 
Pound counted Sedgwick among just nine pre-Civil War authors and Sedgwick's two 
textbooks, On Damages (1847) and On Interpretation of Statutory and Constitutional 
Law (1857), among eighteen textbooks which "went far to shape the law." ROSCOE 
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 140 (1938). With two entries on 
Pound's list, Sedgwick tied Joel Bishop for second place; Justice Story was a clear first 
with nine of the titles. 
82. THEODORE SEDGWICK, How SHALL THE LAWYERS BE PAID? OF SOME REMARKS 
UPON Two ACTS RECENTLY PASSED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE COSTS OF LEGAL PROCEED-
INGS IN A LETTER TO JOHN ANTHON (1840). 
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"shall not the client also be compensated for the vexation and delay to 
which he is put by the losing party, whether that annoyance be occa-
sioned by the resistance of a just demand or by the prosecution of an 
unfounded claim?"83 
Sedgwick faulted existing legal rules for two principal deficien-
cies: they sought to control fees between attorney and client, and they 
determined fees based on a deficient system that promoted waste. 
The only feature Sedgwick did like in the old laws was that losers 
paid. In his pamphlet Sedgwick sought to devise a "better mode." He 
rested his proposal on three cardinal principles (his term) that should 
form the basis of a modern American rule: 
(1) The losing party should pay all the expenses of the liti-
gation. Sedgwick called this a "rule of inherent justice." 
(2) Those expenses should only be "fair charges," that is 
those expenses for a "lawyer of respectability" and not 
for a lawyer of "remarkable or extraordinary ability." 
(3) That the losing party should pay "only for what is done, 
and that no more shall be done than is necessary to se-
cure the ends of justice." The system should not create 
inducement for useless labor. 
Sedgwick proposed a system where the successful plaintiff would get 
a percentage of the recovery while the successful defendant would be 
entitled to a percentage of the amount claimed by the unsuccessful 
plaintiff. That percentage would decrease as the amount in contro-
versy increased, but would increase as the time required to resolve 
the case increased. Of critical importance to Sedgwick was that his 
system did not fix the charges that lawyers could charge their client; 
it controlled only the amounts that could be awarded. 
Sedgwick and David Dudley Field, Jr. were associated in Field's 
law practice. They worked together in the 1846 revision of the New 
York Constitution. Whether they worked together on the cost and fee 
allocation provisions of the 1848 civil procedure form is not known to 
me, but it seems likely that Field was been aware of Sedgwick's 1840 
proposal. 
The Field Code of Civil Procedure adopted in New York in 1848 
adopted two key principles: freedom of lawyers to agree on fees with 
their clients (a principle dear to the hearts of the bar) and loser-pays 
(a principle of less dearness to the bar). The Code's first provision on 
the point, section 258, repealed all laws "establishing or regulating" 
attorneys' fees and provided that the "measure of such compensation 
shall be left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties." The 
balance of the Code provisions on costs set out the terms ofloser-pay. 
The Commission's report, without qualification adhered to loser-pays 
83. Id. at 4. 
2010] COST AND FEE ALLOCATION 219 
and the principle of right: "The losing party, ought however, as a gen-
eral rule, to pay the expense of the litigation. He has caused a loss to 
his adversary unjustly, and should indemnify him for it."84 
From here, however, the history becomes murky. One of the first 
treatises on Field's Code asserted that the Code itself "obviously 
failed to obtain" the very object that the Commissioners had pro-
posed.85 The terms of the Code were revised already in 1857 to make 
awarding attorneys' fees more difficult. Throughout the balance of 
the century, largely out-of-public observation, lawyers disputed over 
when and how fees should be awarded. When it came before the pub-
lic, however, there was sympathy for making losers pay. Not long 
after the turn of the century, however, it seems that no-indemnity 
was the working rule and a true loser-pays rule was only a memory.86 
So little in memory was it that it seems the issue, although subject of 
some interest in the academic community, was not even considered in 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.87 
E. The Future-Bar Support for the Practice Today 
In the bar, the American practice is practically sacrosanct. Small 
wonder that it is: what is its downside for the practicing professional? 
The only downside is that attorneys must or should turn-away valid 
claims that are not financially viable. That may be particularly hard 
to do for a regular client. But who wants to take a claim to court only 
to see the legal fees equal or exceed any possible recovery? That is a 
common result for claims under $25,000 and not unusual for amounts 
of $100,000 or even $1 million. 
In all other respects the practice is a lawyer's delight. There is 
little reason not to bring a lawsuit where a nuisance recovery will 
make the client happy. There is little reason not to inflate a demand 
in the hope that it will increase the eventual settlement. And the 
practice offers benefits for defense counsel as well. Lawyers often 
grouse that physicians get to bury their mistakes. The American 
practice means that at least when lawyers lose, their clients are not 
doubly burdened with the fees that their adversaries charged. When 
84. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING: CODE OF 
PROCEDURE 206 (1848). 
85. HENRY WHITAKER, PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE CODES, ORIGINAL AND 
AMENDED, WITH APPENDIX OF FORMS 600 (1852). 
86. See, e.g., Joseph L. Prager, Letter to the Editor: Too Much Litigation: Relieving 
Our Overcrowded Courts by Making Unnecessary Appeals to Law More Costly for the 
Defeated Party, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,1923 (recalling a former practice said to have been 
applied in almost every case to allow five percent of the amount in dispute after trial). 
87. See, e.g., Charles T. McCormick, Attorneys' Fees and Other Expenses of Litiga-
tion as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 642 (1931); Philip M. Payne, 
Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397, 430 1934. To 
be sure, the federal law on the subject had largely been stable since the Act of Febru-
ary 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161, commonly referred to as the "Fee Bill of 1853." See id. at 
404 et seq. 
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contemplating that additional deposition or that extra set of interrog-
atories, attorneys need not worry about the fees charges other than 
the fees they themselves charge. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were serious proposals 
for civil justice reform. Although attorney fee reform should be more 
easily accomplished than many other reforms, two of three studies 
avoided the topic altogether and accepted the status quo. The third 
made a timid suggestion of abolishing the rule in a small number of 
cases. The suggestion was met by vigorous criticism.88 
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88. See Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United 
States-Opportunity for Learning from "Civilized" European Procedure Instead of 
Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMPo L. 147, 154 (1994). 
89. The judge's scroll reads: "NOTICE: TO INSURE AGAINST THE BRINGING OF FALSE 
OR BLACK-MAILING smTS, LAWYERS WILL HEREAFTER BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
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The one proposal for a loser-pay rule that achieved substantial 
political traction and significant institutional support was the Repub-
lican Party's 1995 "Contract with America" program. The program as 
it passed the House of Representatives included a loser pay plank. 
The proposal ran into opposition on all fronts: from bar associations, 
who feared for their fees, from consumer groups, who saw loser pays 
as a way to limit recoveries, and from business groups, who were con-
cerned for the unexpected.90 
Recently, in December 2008, the Manhattan Institute issued a 
proposal for a loser-pays rule. That proposal appears to be the first 
serious loser-pays proposal to address what ought to be a necessary 
part of any successful indemnity rule: limitation on the amount of 
attorneys' fees subject to reimbursement. While on its face, it allows 
for reimbursement, it limits reimbursable fees to thirty percent of the 
difference between the amount at trial and the non-prevailing party's 
last settlement offer.91 Whether it will go anywhere, remains to be 
seen. It is no surprise that the plaintiffs bar reacted with criticism.92 
Readers may wonder why American proponents of loser-pay 
rules do not consider limiting how much losers must reimburse to 
levels proportionate to amounts in controversy. Surprisingly, such an 
idea is hardly discussed. Perhaps the reason is that such a rule would 
likely have consequences lawyers would not like to consider. If fees 
reimbursable fees are limited, clients are likely to pressure them not 
to do more than the fees allow. Worse still, from lawyers' perspective, 
clients are likely to expect their lawyers to take no more in fees than 
what they are legally entitled to recover. 
In the end, a limit on reimbursement could lead to the discussion 
that is of greatest need: keeping total expenses, whether subject of 
indemnity or not, proportionate with the matter in controversy. 
COSTS IN ALL SUITS BROUGHT BY THEM." The lawyer's writ reads: "FAKE LAW SUIT FOR 
DAMAGES." His bag is marked "A SHYSTER." 
90. See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 2; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Com-
pensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-
Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317 (1998) (referring to the "high water mark" for 
fee shifting). 
91. GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COSTS, supra note 63, at 18. 
92. See, e.g., Tami Kamin-Meyer, Surprise! Conservative think tank study again 
suggests that"loser-pays" is right for America, PLAINTIFF MAGAZINE 1 (March 2009) 
available at www.plaintiffmagazine.com. 
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